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Abstract: This paper attempts to integrate an agnotological taxonomy of “not-knowing” with argumentation theory. 
Given rhetoric’s emphasis on what arguers choose to make present for their audience, it is argued that the rhetorical 
approach is best suited to accommodate the proposed taxonomy. In doing so we can improve the capacities of both 
arguers and audiences to detect adverse elements such as prejudices, implicit biases, and ideologies, which can 
restrict an argument’s claim to objectivity.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Moving away from the traditional conception of ignorance as that which is “not yet known,” 
recent interdisciplinary work in social epistemology is beginning to focus on the conscious, 
unconscious, and structural production of ignorance. Formulated as the study of ignorance 
broadly conceived, this new line of inquiry recently coined “agnotology” aims to dissolve this 
monolithic concept and develop new taxonomies of ignorance that can differentiate the various 
kinds of “not-knowing” that appear in social discourse. Drawing on some theoretical insights that 
have emerged from agnotology in recent years, this paper will offer an original, yet preliminary 
taxonomy of “not-knowing” in order to demonstrate the importance of agnotological 
considerations for argumentation theory. I will then attempt to integrate my proposed taxonomy 
with existing treatments of ignorance in the argumentation theory literature—primarily with the 
work of Douglas Walton. By focusing on one particular kind of not-knowing that falls outside 
the scope of logical and dialectical approaches, I shall further argue that a rhetorical approach to 
argumentation is best suited to accommodate such a taxonomy given the strong emphasis that 
rhetoric places on what a speaker chooses to make present for an audience. In particular, I will 
examine the extent to which Christopher Tindale’s conception of the cognitive environment may 
provide a way of theorizing the various kinds of not-knowing involved in argumentation. I will 
conclude by suggesting that approaching argumentation not only from the perspective of 
knowledge, but also from the perspective of ignorance might put argumentation theory in a better 
position to conceptualize and inquire into the nature of adverse elements such as bias, which can 
be seen to restrict an argument’s claim to objectivity. 
 
2. Agnotology  
 
2.1. Why agnotology? 
 
If asked to try and define the discipline of philosophy, there is one response that we might expect 
to hear from philosophers of all stripes: one aspect of philosophy is to inquire into the nature of 
knowledge, what kinds of knowledge there are, and how we might improve our cognitive 
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practices such that we can become better knowers. While the history of philosophy has no 
shortage of attempts to answer such questions, all accounts of knowledge, explicitly or not, must 
in some way make reference to the nature of ignorance, that is, what it means to not know 
something. When we consider today how much money is spent actively suppressing existing 
knowledge, such as the health risks of smoking in the 1950s or evidence concerning climate 
change today, it can be seen how both philosophers and argumentation theorists might want to 
take a closer look at ignorance and its diverse manifestations, which have typically been defined 
only as an afterthought to the serious business of epistemology.  
 In this direction, “agnotology,” first coined by Robert Proctor as a counterweight to 
traditional concerns of epistemology, has now become an important philosophical endeavour in 
its own right. As Londa Schiebinger explains, Proctor’s motivation was to refocus the question 
about how we know to include questions about what we do not know and why not. The basic 
assumption that lies at the heart of this line of inquiry is simply that there must be many different 
ways not to know given how admittedly restricted our knowledge is compared to the vastness of 
ignorance (Proctor and Schiebinger, p. 3). This inquiry thus invites us to pose questions 
concerning the naturalness of ignorance and to think about “the conscious, unconscious, and 
structural production of ignorance, its diverse causes and conformations, whether brought about 
by neglect, forgetfulness, myopia, extinction, secrecy or suppression” (Proctor and Schiebinger, 
p.3.). While agnotology is primarily concerned with developing a comprehensive and 
interdisciplinary social theory of ignorance, I want to approach this question from a more 
philosophical point of view and suggest that this inquiry may also pose interesting challenges to 
the field of argumentation, which often tends to give greater attention to epistemological 
concerns rather than agnotological ones. Before discussing how it might be possible to 
incorporate some of these considerations into argumentation theory, I will first sketch out a 
preliminary taxonomy of not-knowing that may be helpful in distinguishing between the various 
kinds of ignorance in question.   
 
2.2. Rumsfeld’s agnotology 
 
In a news briefing in 2002, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made what is now an 
infamous statement that is often mocked, yet is actually a useful starting point for distinguishing 
between various kinds of ignorance. Indeed, Proctor even includes the following quotation in a 
brief section on famous quotes about ignorance in Agnotology (2008), yet does not give it any 
direct attention. What is of interest here in this quotation is that Rumsfeld attempts to sketch out 
a theory of different kinds of ignorance in an attempt to justify the American invasion of Iraq. 
Quoting Rumsfeld: 
 
Reports that say something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because 
as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We 
also know there are known unknowns that is to say we know there are some 
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we 
don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our 
country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the 
difficult ones. (Quoted in Proctor and Schiebinger, p. 29) 
 
What we find here is Rumsfeld philosophizing about the relationship between the known and the 
unknown by intersecting the two terms with each other in three different ways. Let us briefly 
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review these categories, as I will attempt to use Rumsfeld’s taxonomy as a starting point in order 
to shed light on the kinds of ignorance that an agnotological study might propose to investigate. 
 The first category is that of the “known knowns”, that is, the things we know that we 
know, or simply positive knowledge. Second there are the “known unknowns”, which are things 
that we know that we do not know and can think of as the traditional, monolithic conception of 
ignorance that agnotology has proposed we move away from. The third and final category that 
Rumsfeld mentions, which he identifies as “the difficult ones,” are the “unknown unknowns,” 
and are things so distant and unimaginable to us that we are not even aware of our own ignorance 
of them. While I am in no way suggesting that Rumsfeld is any kind of serious philosopher, what 
is interesting about this taxonomy, as Slavoj Žižek has recently pointed out, is that he fails to 
apply his method to the end and omits the fourth logically possible category: the “unknown 
knowns” (Žižek, p. 9). Where Žižek wants to identify this category with what psychoanalysis 
calls “the unconscious,” as “the knowledge which doesn’t know itself,” I will forego that line of 
thought here and attempt to inquire further into this fourth category in terms of rhetoric and try 
and show why this category may be important for argumentation theorists to consider.  
 
 
1.  
 
 
Known knowns 
3.   
 
 
Unknown knowns* 
2.   
 
 
Known unknowns 
4.   
 
 
Unknown unknowns 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Rumsfeld’s taxonomy (with Žižek’s addition*) 
 
 With respect to the above-mentioned categories (Figure 1), all but one (i.e. the known 
knowns) involves some relationship to the unknown. We are thus left with three initial kinds of 
ignorance, or three ways of distinguishing between distinct kinds of not-knowing: (4) the 
unknown unknowns, (2) the known unknowns, and (3) the unknown knowns. In the next section 
I will discuss each of these three conceptions in turn.  
 
3. Kinds of ignorance in argumentation theory 
 
In this section I will discuss each of these three distinct kinds of ignorance in order to show that 
at least two of them correspond to existing conceptions of ignorance in the argumentation 
literature, before moving on to discuss the third which, to my knowledge, does not. 
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3.1. The unknown unknowns: meta-ignorance 
 
The characteristic feature of the first category, the unknown unknowns, is that we are ignorant of 
our very ignorance of them. We might think of this category as a necessary kind of ignorance 
that comes with the finite standpoints that human beings occupy. The unknown unknowns are 
thus in some sense ineradicable as they must be presupposed whenever we take up a course of 
action. We might think here of what John Rawls has called the “veil of ignorance,” which is a 
necessary ethical assumption that we must presuppose with respect to the consequences of our 
actions, since we can never in advance take account of those things that we are ignorant of our 
own ignorance about. For Rumsfeld, it was this kind of ignorance about Saddam Hussein’s 
regime that posed the greatest threat to America and its allies.  
 With respect to the existence of this kind of ignorance in argumentation theory, and in 
terms of reasoning more generally, the presence of unknown unknowns is why informal 
logicians tend to qualify the conclusions of some arguments as “defeasible,” or “presumptive.” 
In this sense, unknown unknowns are an essential ingredient of evidence-based reasoning and 
simply mean that upon the discovery of further evidence, the conclusions of our arguments, 
however well constructed they may have been, are in principle always open to re-evaluation in 
order to accommodate new evidence. To move away from Rumsfeld’s somewhat clumsy 
terminology, following Michael Smithson, I will refer to this kind of not-knowing as “meta-
ignorance” (Proctor and Schiebinger, p. 210). 
 
3.2. The known unknowns: conscious ignorance 
 
The next category is that of the known unknowns. This kind of not-knowing is what we typically 
mean in everyday language when we use the word ignorance and has been the kind most 
theorized in the argumentation literature. This sense of the term can be likened, in part, to the 
traditional conception of ignorance agnotology hopes to move away from—as that which is not 
yet known, or what Proctor calls “ignorance as native state (or resource)” (Proctor and 
Schiebinger, p. 4). According to Proctor, this kind of “ignorance is most commonly seen…as 
something in need of correction, a kind of natural absence or void where knowledge has not yet 
spread” (p. 2). With respect to argumentation theory, this is the kind of ignorance meant when 
we talk about arguments from ignorance. Douglas Walton, for example, in Arguments from 
Ignorance, has emphasized the importance of inquiring into the nature of these arguments, which 
are sometimes referred to as lack-of-knowledge inferences, inferences from negative evidence, 
or negative proof (Walton 1996, p. 1). While this form of argument is often considered to be 
fallacious, often on the basis of foundationalist conceptions of logic, Walton argues instead that 
this kind of argument is often of the presumptive kind and can, in the appropriate context, be a 
reasonable argument form. A simple example provided by Walton in the introduction to 
Arguments From Ignorance is the following:  
 
A man is sitting inside a warehouse that has a tin roof and no windows. Tin roofs 
are notorious for making lots of noise inside a building when it rains outside. The 
man in the warehouse cannot see outside, so he could not tell directly if it were 
raining at a given time. But he could infer indirectly, using, for example, the 
following argument: if it were raining now I would know it (by the noise); but I 
do not know it; therefore, it is not raining now. (Walton 1996, p. 1) 
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While it is possible to imagine reasons that could prevent such a conclusion from being true, 
Walton simply wants to argue that, in certain circumstances such as legal reasoning, this kind of 
argument can often be quite instructive, and should not simply be dismissed categorically as 
fallacious. To situate the sense of ignorance being used here by Walton within the proposed 
taxonomy I will refer to this kind of ignorance as conscious ignorance (Proctor and Schiebinger, 
p. 210).1  
 Walton’s Arguments from Ignorance thus serves as a notable example of the extent to 
which rich accounts of particular kinds of ignorance already exist in the argumentation literature. 
What I am suggesting here is that by better distinguishing between these various kinds of 
ignorance we can continue to explore the role of not-knowing in argumentation beyond the scope 
of the above two categories.  
 
3.3. The unknown knowns: constitutive ignorance 
 
Where Rumsfeld had thought that the most difficult and dangerous kinds of ignorance were the 
unknown unknowns, following Žižek’s addition we should instead look towards the omitted and 
often neglected category of the “unknown knowns” that have, he claims, in one form or another, 
been the privileged topic of philosophy—as the transcendental horizon, or frame of our 
experience of reality (Žižek , p. 10). This paradoxical category of unknown knowledge has been 
of interest to many post-Cartesian thinkers in various ways (e.g. Marx, Freud, Heidegger, 
Foucault, etc.) as that which remains inaccessible to the knowing subject yet remains known in a 
certain sense below the surface of conscious experience. The reason that I want to focus on this 
category is that this kind of not-knowing seems unable to be dealt with directly by logical and 
dialectical approaches to argumentation. Thus, if we take the challenge of agnotology seriously 
and begin to look at arguments from the perspective not only of knowledge, but also from a more 
robust, pluralistic conception of ignorance, then it seems to me that we will need to give rhetoric 
a more fundamental role in any approach to argumentation. Whether or not my suggestion that 
rhetoric is needed to think this category is correct, I think that this kind of ignorance is 
nonetheless an important concept for further research.  
 What are these unknown knowns and how do they manifest in argumentation? And why 
do we need rhetoric in order to adequately think about this kind of not-knowing? To answer 
these questions, I think we can look to Chaïm Perelman who, following Aristotle, claimed that 
arguing effectively involves adapting appropriately to one’s audience. For Perelman, this 
adaption amounts to choosing as points of departure (ideally) only theses that are accepted by 
those we address (Perelman, p. 21). The arguer will thus have to make a choice. Perelman writes: 
“Every argument implies a preliminary selection of facts and values, their specific description in 
a given language, and an emphasis which varies with the importance given them” (p. 34). The 
arguer thus chooses to single out certain things in their discourse to which the audience ought to 
give their attention, giving those chosen features a presence that prevents them from being 
neglected. What is important about this rhetorical conception of the act of arguing with respect to 
unknown knowns is that by choosing to make this or that present, the arguer also makes other 
things absent or implicit, such as the facts, values or interests that underlie what one chooses to 
make present. Thus, in making an argument the arguer necessarily presupposes certain facts and 
values as known by the audience in order to make others explicit. The problem, however, is that 
                                                        
1 I am again following the terminology proposed by Michael Smithson. 
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if the audience does not supply the correct presuppositions to the explicit contents of the 
argument, or is perhaps even unaware of the implicit contents beneath what is made present, then 
the argument effectively constructs a kind of ignorance in the audience towards those points of 
departure beneath the surface of the arguer’s explicit discourse. It is this necessary level of 
constructed ignorance towards the implicit contents beneath the argument itself and is generated 
in the audience by the speech acts of the arguer that I want to call constitutive ignorance. What 
distinguishes this kind of not-knowing from the kind found in the “argument from ignorance”—
which uses conscious ignorance as a positive reason for inferring a particular conclusion—is that 
constitutive ignorance refers to that which is never made explicit in the argument, but is only 
implied by its explicit contents, unbeknownst to the audience whose attention is being drawn to 
the explicit theses presented for their consent. It is this kind of ignorance that, on my view, is 
best captured by a rhetorical approach to argumentation given the complex ways in which it is 
naturally generated by the interaction of particular arguers with particular audiences, in particular 
contexts on particular questions.   
 
4. Agnotology and rhetorical argumentation 
 
 
1.  
 
Conscious knowledge 
 
(known knowns) 
3.   
 
Constitutive ignorance 
 
(unknown knowns) 
 
2.   
 
Conscious ignorance 
 
(known unknowns) 
4.   
 
Meta-ignorance 
 
(unknown knowns) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
Taxonomy of not-knowing 
 
With this rough outline of a possible taxonomy of not-knowing, I want to further elaborate on 
my reasons for thinking that a rhetorical approach to argumentation is needed to accommodate 
these various kinds of ignorance into argumentation theory. To do so I will expand on what has 
been called the “cognitive environment” in order to show how the kinds of ignorance elaborated 
above might be grounded in such a rhetorical approach. 
 So, what is the cognitive environment? Building on Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber’s 
notion of the “cognitive environment”—as the set of facts, assumptions, and beliefs that are 
actually or potentially able to be made manifest to a person—Christopher Tindale has further 
developed this notion as a collective space of potential and actual knowledge that we cohabitate 
with others. This space is not simply something that we consciously construct for ourselves, but 
is something historically inherited, something we depend on, take from, and contribute to. In 
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terms of rhetoric, the cognitive environment is thus a source of topoi that an arguer can go to and 
draw upon to imagine what an audience should know or should have access to given their 
participation in this common space (Tindale, p. 7). What is important about the cognitive 
environment is that, among other things, it is modifiable through argumentation and provides us 
with a way to talk about the cognitive nature of rhetoric. Following Perelman, the view of 
“cognitive” involved here is not only an epistemic notion, but rather concerns the “whole 
person,” including their values, emotions, histories, interests, and the like.  
 On Tindale’s account, it is reasonable to infer that an arguer who shares in a mutual 
cognitive environment with his or her audience will have access to some of what is present there 
and can thus draw on those resources in order to elicit the adherence of the audience. One 
theoretical advantage of the cognitive environment, which Tindale offers as an alternative to 
Perelman’s controversial notion of a “universal audience,” is that it can allow us to better 
theorize about what we are actually doing when we argue. Thus, when we argue, by virtue of 
participating in a shared cognitive environment, we can draw on its resources and make present 
those things that, while not currently present to our audience at a given moment, can be made 
present by activating ideas, memories, facts, images, and values that occupy this collective space. 
While Tindale’s account of the cognitive environment offers an ideal starting point, it too tends 
to characterize this collective space only in terms of knowledge and thus ought to be expanded to 
include such agnotological considerations as I am proposing here. In what follows I want to spell 
out how we might conceive of the cognitive environment as populated and structured not only by 
different kinds of knowledge, but also by the kinds of ignorance discussed above. 
 The first category, conscious knowledge, refers to those positive contents of the cognitive 
environment that have been placed within this collective space as known and can be drawn upon 
as the conscious resources available to an arguer. An example of populating the cognitive 
environment with contents that could be described as conscious knowledge might be when a 
political party wants to get a certain message across to their constituents and tries to flood the 
cognitive environment with a slogan or image that will get their message out to as many people 
as possible. The second category, conscious ignorance, refers to those positive contents of the 
cognitive environment that have been placed within this collective space as unknown, that is, as 
known to be unknown. An example of this might be a call for papers, where a certain theme, 
topic or problem is put out into the cognitive environment as unknown in order to invite others to 
participate in a shared inquiry. The third category, meta-ignorance, can be thought of as the very 
limits of the cognitive environment itself. What is outside of the cognitive environment is not 
only inaccessible to an arguer, but is not even known to be inaccessible. The final category, 
constitutive ignorance, refers to those contents of the cognitive environment that have been 
placed within this collective space negatively, that is, as implicit and unstated presuppositions of 
the explicit contents that can be found there. To give an example of this, we might think here of 
what we call common sense. While the explicit contents of many common sense expressions are 
known to be known, what these may imply upon further reflection and examination is often not 
known to people who nonetheless use this common sense in everyday interactions. Another 
example of how the cognitive environment may become populated with this kind of ignorance is 
when someone echoes arguments or talking points on a certain issue that they have just read on 
the Internet or heard on television. While this person may like or agree with an explicit argument 
in favour of a particular position, they may also be unaware of the implicit presuppositions or 
social consequences beneath the surface of the explicit argument they are repeating. In this way, 
it is possible to see how the cognitive environment can become populated and structured not only 
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by its positive contents, but also negatively by the different kinds of ignorance that actively 
participate in the structure or fabric of this collective space.  
  With this admittedly rudimentary mapping of the taxonomy I have proposed to the 
rhetorical concept of the cognitive environment, I have tried to argue that an integration of a 
richer and more pluralistic conception of ignorance will require a rhetoric-based approach to 
argumentation. While I am aware that what I have proposed here is but a first attempt to integrate 
different kinds of ignorance into argumentation theory and that much more work needs to be 
done in developing this connection further, without some kind of rhetorical approach—such as 
the one offered by Tindale—it is hard to imagine how either a logical or dialectical approach 
alone would be able to capture the various senses of ignorance that I have attempted to outline 
here. By expanding the concept of the cognitive environment to include not only the positive 
contents of that collective space, but also the plurality of ignorances that constitute it, the 
rhetorical approach gives us a way to better conceptualize the often ignored role of ignorance in 
a variety of discursive practices.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In support of the integration that I am proposing, before concluding I want to briefly draw 
attention to some of the directions in which some of the considerations of agnotology might be 
further developed within argumentation theory. One direction of further research that I think 
ought to be explored from this perspective is the nature of adverse elements that manifest in 
argumentation such as bias, prejudice, and ideology, and how such adverse elements might 
restrict arguments from obtaining some kind of greater objectivity. Existing theories of bias, for 
example, have been characterized differently depending on whether one takes a logical or 
dialectical approach to argumentation. In traditional logical approaches, bias in reasoning is 
treated as “an erroneous inference where standards of correct (valid) inference characteristic of 
deductive and inductive standards of logic fail to be met” (Walton 1999, p. xvi). Against this 
narrow view, according to the dialectical approach proposed by Walton, bias is characterized in 
relation to the context of an argument’s use within the framework of a dialogue (1999, p. xvi.) 
On this view, the rectification of bias would involve the relevant parties adequately following a 
dialectical procedure appropriate to the particular kind of dialogue being undertaken. While such 
a dialectical conception of bias has advantages over the logical in that it is more applicable to 
“many of the most common kinds of cases in everyday argumentation,” it too, as Walton readily 
admits, is itself quite narrow and excludes many other senses of the term, such as gender bias, 
racial prejudice and others (1999, p. xvi.) Thus, while it is possible to provide a narrow definition 
of bias from the perspective of either logic or dialectic for the purposes of normative evaluation, 
both approaches exclude other aspects that admittedly ought to be considered as well.  
 This deadlock seems to echo the concerns of J. Anthony Blair, who had already pointed 
out that the very notion of bias is often characterized in incompatible and contradictory ways, 
and put to such “confusingly different uses” that “someone committed to clarity might be 
tempted to bypass it altogether” (Blair, p. 31). Instead of bypassing the term altogether, a 
potential remedy to the confusion surrounding this notion might be to approach the problem from 
a different direction. Given the epistemological emphasis of most approaches to argumentation, I 
suggest that the notion of bias might be better approached from the perspective of a pluralistic 
conception of ignorance, capable of distinguishing between the various meanings attributed to 
bias as they are used in both technical and everyday language. In this way, we might be able to 
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avoid Blair’s worry and develop a more robust theory of bias in argumentation that can 
characterize existing uses of the concept in terms of the kinds of ignorance that they involve, 
rather than the ideals of knowledge that they fail to achieve.  
 To conclude, I have argued that argumentation theory should think not only about the 
relationship between argumentation and knowledge, but also about argumentation and ignorance. 
In order to do so, I suggested that the best way to integrate agnotological considerations into 
argumentation theory is with a rhetorical approach, such as that of Tindale and his conception of 
the cognitive environment, which serves as the rhetorical ground of argumentation. While I am 
aware that many will have reservations about privileging the role of rhetoric in the way that I 
have suggested, I hope that I have nonetheless persuaded some of the viability of approaching 
argumentation from the perspective of agnotology and the various kinds of not-knowing that it 
proposes to investigate. 
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